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Today, with a growing knowledge of the law by parents, it is espe-
cially important that the classroom teacher be aware of and have a thorough 
understanding of the legal concepts surrounding American education. Educa-
tors may differ in regard to the many educational aspects of teaching, but 
they share one common goal: to obtain for teaching the recognition which it 
deserves as a significant profession. It is an objective which to a large 
extent depends upon the legal sanctions and controls surrounding the profes-
sion's members. State constitutions and statutes provide for the teachers 
as teachers, but their rights and responsibilities as individuals are being 
hammered out in courtrooms and legislative chambers. 1 
In loco parentis is a legal term and according to common law it has a 
legal meaning. It is the court's description of the relationship which exists 
between teacher and pupil. This relationship implies legal rights, duties, 
and responsibilities. Those engaged in education must be aware of all such 
1M• Chester Nolte and John Phillip Linn, School Law for Teachers 
(Danville, Illinois: Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1963), p. 7. 
1 
2 
implications which are determined both legislatively and judicially. 
The purpose of this paper will be to survey the principles enunciated 
by the courts in litigated decisions regarding the rights, responsibilities, 
and liabilities of teachers and other school authorities to discipline pupils 
through corporal punishment. Particular attention will be focused on the view 
accepted by Illinois courts on the subject of corporal punishl'lent since by 
implication, the United States Constitution reserves the control of education 
to the states. 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States. 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people. 2 
Education, then, is a state function. There are four ways by which the 
state governs its schools: 
(1) Constitutional proviSions, 
(2) statutes, 
(3) court decisions, 
(4) rules and regulations of state boards of education.) 
These concepts of the origin of authority and means of governing 
education as a function of the state are hasic to an understanding of the 
study of corporal punishment and Illinois court decisions. 
As a part of governmental machinery, the courts play 
a large part in the administration of public education. 
They are charged with the responsibility for interpreting 
the laws, for determining their constitutionality, and for 
questions deciding the legality of the actions of those 
2U.5. Constitution, Art. 17. 
~eonard E. Meece, A Manual for School Board Members, (Lexington: 
U. of Kentucky, XXIX, June-1957, No.4), p. 8. 
responsible for administering the public schools. In so 
doing, they are guided bI legal principles which have 
grown up over the years. 
Such is the function of the Illinois judiciary. 
Preliminary investigation reveals that there is little evidence of 
3 
significant decisions involving Illinois. Therefore, decisions of some courts 
of last resort in states other than Illinois, will be used to clarify the 
legal position of the teacher in relation to pupils. While such decisions of 
courts outside Illinois are not binding on Illinois, they would be consulted 
and utilized as a persuasive force should a similar situation arise. 
A special effort will be made to acquaint teachers and other school 
authorities with a definition and application of those common law principles 
in Illinois. 
The study is not intended as a critical analysis of the courts' 
decisions, but, as a simple exposition of common law as interpreted by Illinoi 
courts. It is hoped that teachers will benefit from this study. 
No study bears similarity to this study of corporal punishment by those 
standing in loco parentis as viewed by Illinois courts. 
4L•O• Garber, The Yearbook of School Law. 1958 (Danville, Ill.: 
Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1958) p. 6. 
4 
However, two general studies on corporal punishment of children and 
court deeisions in the United States were done by Hubert J. Freestrom at 
DePaul University in 1957,5 and Dennis P. Burke at the University of 
Pittsburgh in 1958. 6 These studies of corporal punishment included summaries 
of 8 general nature to discussions and definitions of corporal punishment and 
the defeDses which were available. Freestro~s study is limited to the years 
1900-1955. Burket. study 1s limited to the years 1832-1957. 
This study is similar to the above mentioned in this scope. However, 
the propo8ed study will deal with common law principles relating to corporal 
punishment, the status of teachers. the statuI of children, in I1l1nois; and 
will not emphasize the reason why the punishment waa administered, unless such 
a reason has direct bearing on the significance of the decision. 
Some pertinent questions to be considered in this study are as follows: 
What is law? Common law? Civll law? 
What is the civil law in the United States? 
What is the CommoB law in the United States? 
What is the source of the state of Illinois' 
authority to govern education? 
What powers are delegated to boards of education? 
What binding force do they po.sess' 
SHubert J. Frsestrom, "Corporal Punishment and Court Decisions 1900-1955" 
(unpublished Master's thesis, DePaul University. Chicago, Illinois. 1957). 
6nennis P. Burke, "A Study of Court Cases Resulting from Corporal 
Punlahment in Public Schools" (unpublished Ph.D dissertation. University 
of Pittsburgh, 1958). 
What is corporal 
courts? 
What is criminal 
What is a tort? 
punishment as viewed by the Illinois 
responsibility? Civil liability? 
What 1s the criteria of a tort? 
What is the meaning of in loco parentis from c01llD.on 
law? 
Bow is the teacher protected? What are the rights of 
the teacher? 
How is the pupil protected in terms of the rights and 
duties of parents? 
To what extent is the pupil bound by the rules and 
regulations of the school? 
In order to locate the citations, reference was made to the various 
legal indices and handbooks which deal with the principles of common law in 
Illinois. 
The Restatement to the Law of Torts, Vol. 1. 
Callaghan't Illinois Digest (3rd Ed.) Vol. 4, I 2.5, 
"Assault and Battery." 
Illinois Digest, Vol. 4, "Assault and Battery. 'I 
Illinois Law and Practice, Vol. 3, chapter 2, 
"Assault and Battery." 
After the cases were located, reference was made to the Illinois 
.5 
Reports and to the Illinois Appellate Reports where the information pertinent 
to the study was taken from the cited cases. 
Reference was made to the following indices in locating the citations 
to school cases related to corporal punishment from other states: 
American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol. 6, § 8 46. 47, 122, 
149, 150, "Assault alld Battery." 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol 79, "Schools and School 
Districts," • 502, "Corporal Punishment." 
After the citations were located, reference was made to the Reports 
pf other states to locate information in the cases. 
6 
Shepard's Citations and Shephard's Illinois Citations proved to be most 
useful in locating related cases. Other useful sources for locating articles 
related to corporal punishment were Reader's Guide, Education Index, Legal 
Periodical Index. 
Other sources of information will be cited in the bibliography of this 
paper. 
CHAPTER II 
LEGISLATIVE DIRECTIVES IN EDUCATION 
Origin and Application 
Basic to an understanding of the courts' views on corporal punishment is 
an understanding of the legal theory by which the various levels of legislative 
bodies derive their authority. 
The word "law" itself is of Scandinavian orif~in and came into English 
about 1000 A. D. from prehistoric Old Norse which had derived it from the Old 
Icelandic word meaning "someth1.ng laid or fixed. n1 
Blackstone defined law, "In its broadest sense, law signifies a rule of 
action. ,,2 Specifically, he defined law as common law and civil law. 
Civil law as defined by Blackstone is, II ••• a rule of civil conduct, 
prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what 1s right and 
prohibiting what is wrong."3 Civil law is written law. 
Gavit, in commenting on Blackstone's definition of Common Law. states, 
"It must be emphasized that we have inherited and adopted, ••• a system of 
judge-made laws. It i8 unwritten in the sense that it is not stated in 8 
1Qxford English Dictionary; Jespersen, Growth and Structure of the 
English Language, par. 74 (Anchor, 9th ed.,1955) as quoted in David Mellinkoff, 
The Language of the Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963) p. 34. 
2Bernard C. Gavit (Ed.), Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law (Washington 




legislative enactment but found in the decisions of the courts •••• The Common 
Law system is, therefore, not only a system of administering law, but a system 
for making law by judicial decision rather than legislative enactment. "4 
Common law, therefore, is defined as, "distinguished from law created by 
the enactment of leg1slat~res, ••• comprises the body of those principles and 
rules of action, relating to the government and security of persons and 
property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of 
immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts recog-
i i ffi i d f i h d to S • ,,5 n z ng, a rm ng, an en arc ng sue usages an cus m •••• 
By these two sources, civil law and common law, the citizens of the 
United States of America are protected and governed. 
In civil law, The Constitution of the United States is " ••• the supreme 
law of the Land. u6 All laws, including the constitutions of the individual 
states, "shall be made in Pursuance, thereof; ••• and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, ••• ,,7 Thus, common law in the United States, 
will be founded on the principles set forth in the federal constitution as 
interpreted by the courts. 
The sections of the U.S. Constitution which are interpreted as having 
the most bearing on the schools are those which protect the "inherent" rights 
of the individual. These are Article I, section 10; and the Pirst, Pifth, and 
4Ibid., p. 58. 
SHenry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, (4th ed.; St. Paul, 
Minn., 1951). 
6U• S. Constitution, Article VI, section 2. 
7 
9 
Fourteenth Amendments. The Tenth Amendment, however, has been interpreted as 
reserving to the states the powers to regulate and control education. 
The Tenth Amendment reads as follows: 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are res~rved to the states respectively, or to the 
people. 
This Tenth Ameod~~nt made the function of education a state responsibility, 
since nowhere io the Constitution is education mentioned. Therefore, each 
state in the Union has established and supported a system of public education. 
In the preamble to the School Act of 1821., Illinois expressed the 
acceptance ~f the responsibility for establishing a system of free public 
schools by the Illinois legislature: 
To enjoy our rights and liberties, we must under-
stand them; their security and protection ought to be 
the first object of a free people: and it is a well 
established fact, that no nation has ever continued 
long in the enjoyrJent of civil and political freedom, 
which was not both virtuous and enlightened; and 
believing that the advancement of literature always 
has been, and always will be, the means of developing 
more fully the rights of man; that the mind of every 
citizen in a republic is the common property of 
SOCiety, and constitutes the basis of its strength 
and happiness; it is therefore considered the peculiar 
duty of a free government like ours, to encourage and 
extend the improvement and cultivation of the intel-
lectual energies of the whole. 9 
The statute enacted following this declaration of purpose stated 
three principles: 
8Ibid., Article 17. 
91111n018 Laws, General Assembly, 1825, p. 121. 
Firat, public education 1s recognized as an 
essential duty of the state. 
Second, the control of the operation of the 
school should be delegated to the people of the 
local school district or their elected officials. 
Third. the supervision of the operation of 
the school i8 to be entrusted first to an official 
or officials on the county level aud the more general 
supervision reserved for a state official and 
delegated to him.lf) 
10 
Illinois has had four Constitutions since its admission into the Union 
in 1818, including the present Constitution which was passed into law in 1870. 
Tbe Illinois Constitution of 1818. made no provision to establish a public 
school system; the Constitution of 1825 proclaimed a formal acceptance by the 
State of the responsibility for the education of its citizens; the 1848 
Constitution empowered the General Assembly to exempt school property from 
taxation and recognize school districts as a municipal corporation having 
autl10rity to levy taxes;ll the Illinois Constitution of 1870. teposed the duty 
and limitation in education, 
The General Assembly shall prov1de a thorough and 
efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of 
this State may receive a good common school education. 12 
The same Constitution of 1870 provided that: 
The executive department shall consist of 
a Superintendent of Public Instruction. 13 
10Kenneth H. Lemmer, nTbe State and Public Education. tf Illinois Educa-
tional Press Bulletin: the School Law (May, 1961), p. 5. 
llIbid. 
12Il11n01B, Constitution (1870), Article VIII, sec. 1. 
_., , • 
Illinois has no single state board exercising control over the public 
schools. The School Code provides for school boards: 
School districts having a population of fewer 
than 1000 inhabitants and not governed by any special 
act shall be governed by a board of school dirt~tors 
to consist of members who shall be elected •••• 
Section 34 provides for cities having a population of 500,000. 15 
Article I of the Illinois School Cone defines the term school board: 
••• [school board] means the governing body of any district 
created or operating under the authority of this t~t, including 
board of school directors and board of education. 
11 
These boards are an "agency of the State having existence for the sole 
purpose of performing certain duties deemed necessary to the maintenance of an 
'efficient system of free schools' within the particular locality of its 
jurisdiction.,,17 TIle existence and authority of all boards are derived from 
the legislature; they have no inherent powers, but only those powers which are 
conferred expressly or by necessary implication.18 
There is nothing in the School Code of Illinois pertaining to the corpora 
punishment of children in the public schools. 
However, the law requires local school boards: 
14School Code of Illinois (1963), Sec. 10-1. 
15Ibid ., Sec. 34. 
l6Ibi~., Article I-III. 
17Scown~CzarneckJ, 264 Ill. App. 305 (1914). 
18people ex reI. Dilks v. Board of Education, 283 Ill. App. 378, 388 
(1936). 
To adopt and enforce all necessary rules for the 
management and ggvernment of the public schools in 
their district.l~ 
12 
Within its Constitutional powers, the General Assembly may confer author-
ity on those having charge of the management and conduct of the public schools 
to provide reasonable rules and regulations for the discipline of the pupils. 
This authority is granted to the school boards by the Illinois legislature in 
Section 34-19 of the School Code. The by-laws~ rules and regulations of the 
boards shall have the force of ordinances: 
The board shall. subject to the limitations in 
this Article, establish by-laws, rules and regulations, 
which shall have the force of ordinances, for the proper 
maintenance of a uniform system of discipline for both 
employees and pupils, and for the entire management of 
the schools,... It may expel, suspend or otherwise 
discipline any pupil found guilly of gross disobedience. 
misconduct or other violations of the by-laws, rules and 
regulations. **** Such records and all by-laws, rules and 
regulations, or parts thereof, ••• shall be received as 
eVidence, ••• in all courts and places where jUiadal 
proceedings are had. 20 
An ordinance is an authoritative decree or direction promulgated by 
governmental authority; or a local law or regulation enacted by a municipal 
government. The by-laws of a municipal corporation, in the United States 
oftener called ordinances, are true laws. 2l 
19School Code, Sec. 10-20.5, 1963. 
20Ibid., Sec. 34-19. 
2lWebster's New Collegiate Dictiona!! (Mass.: G. & C. Merriam and Co., 
1953). 
13 
A school board, in determining what rules and by-laws are necessary to 
the proper conduct of the schools, exercises discretion and its determination 
will not be interfered with or set aside l)~' the courts in the absence of a 
clear abuse of the power and discretion conferred. 22 The rules must be rea-
sonable. 
The court, then has agreed with the leg:i.slature that the school board 
is the governing body of the school districts, and grants the broad powers 
of promulgating policies. by-laws, rules and regulations governing pupil 
conduct. 
as: 
The Reference Manual on Written School Board Policies defines policies 
•••• Principles adopted by the school board to chart 
a course of action. They tell what is wanted and may 
include also why and how much. They should be broad 
enough to indicate a line of action to be taken by the 
Superintendent in meeting a number of problems; narrow 
enough to give him clear guidance. 
Rules and regulations are th~ derailed direction 
to put policy into practice. They give specific 
directions telling how, by whom, where, and when things 
are to be done. 23 
In keeping with the aDove definitions, the Board of Education of the 
Chicago Public Schools, for example, has stated as its "policy that firm 
22Sutton v. Board of.Education, 138 N.E. 131, 306 Ill. App. 507 (1923); 
Favorite v. Board of Education of Chicago, 85 N.E. 402, 235 Ill. 314 (1908). 
2~.E.A. publication quoted by Simon L. Friedman, tfPowers of the Board 
to Control Pupil Conduct," I.E.P.B. ~. cit., p. 26. 
14 
discipline shall he maintained in all Chic8?,O Public Schools ••• ,I This policy 
is implemented and defined in its R.ules and Regulations of the Board of 
Education, Sec. 6, (8-22): 
(Corporal Punishment Prohibited). No employee 
of the Board of Education may inflict corporal 
punishment of any kind upon persons attending the 
public schools of the City of Chicago. 24 
The Illinois Constitution. being silent of the manner of pupil disciptw~ 
leaves it to the discretion of the school board. The Chicago Board of Educa-
tion, acting within the delegation of this authority, expressly forbids its 
.~mployee8 to use corporal punishment in disciplining its students. 
It was not possible to collect data regarding policies of school district 
in Illinois on the matter of disciplipe. The Office of the Illinois Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction has no information pertinent to the individual 
school boards' rules. 
In speculating on the views of the Illinois Courts regarding the breach 
of such rules, Simon L. Friedman states, "This we know, it is mandatory for a 
school board to govern its attendance centers. They shall adopt necessary 
rules and regulations to carry out this activity. The crux of the problem Is 
to determine what rules and regulations are necessary to carry out this 
mandate. 
The courts of this State have frequently stated 
that the rules necessary to the proper conduct and 
management of the schools are to be left to the 
24aules of the Board of Education, City of Chicago (1961), Sec. 6-22. 
tliscretion of the hO<1rd~ <lUll when that action if; 
reasonable and within the powers 80 conferred. it 
is the pro',ince of the hoard \1f educution to doter·· 
mine what things are necessary for a good management, 
a good Ol:der, and the discipline of the schools. and 
the necessary rules to ohtain. these results. The 
courts hav~ repeatedly reiu90d to substitute their 
judgt~nt for that of the board and \1111 only 
interfere when such rules are unreasonable, arbitrary, 
discriminatory. and an abuse of power. 25 
15 
The Calumet Park School hoard has a written rule tn which it prohibits 
its employees t~u'! use of corporal pllnishment on students. A teacher was 
dismissed on tha charge that 11e violated this and other hOll-rd rules. It is 
within the right of the board to dismiss a teacher for breach of its rules, 
but only according to tlla legal procedure. outlined itl the School Code of 
Illinois. 
A study of the finding of Dennis P. Uurke on the courts and corporal 
punishment "indicates that our ecl:.ool teachers can look to COl]JL1()t1 law princi-
ples in deteminiu3 their rights relating to corporal pl.mishment. These 
principles bCCOlilI.! t.he law of the land and are in.portant regardless of whether 
the law of the state is silent or decisive on tha issue. ,,2' 
Thu follO\Jing chapters of this study will analyze these common law 
principles as they aro related to the corporal punishment of students by pupil 
by teachers, and their application in the State of Illinois. 
25Friedman. ~. ill.,. p. 27. 
26Dennis P. Burke, til.. Study of Court Cases Resulting from Corporal 
Puni8hment in Public Schools." (Unpublished Doctoral Di8sertatiou t University 
of Pittsburgh, 1955) p. 71. 
CHAPTER III 
NATURE OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
The purpose of this chapter will be to try to acquaint the reader with: 
(1) an understanding of the nature of corporal punishment from the aspect of 
common law in Illinois; (2) the three types of legal actions which can grow 
out of the use of corporal punishment cases; and, (3) the law of torts in 
relation to corporal punishment. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines corporal punishment as, "physical 
punishment, as distinguished from pecuniary punishment, of or inflicted on the 
body, such as whipping •••• nl 
In the matter of discipline and the schools, Prosser gives the following 
principle: 
A parent or one standing in loco parentis may 2 
use reasonable force for the correction of the child. 
The court in Lander v. Seaver suggests the following principle: 
••• the master has always been deemed to have 
the right to punish such offenses. Such power is 
IBlack's Law Dictionary, .!m.. ill. 
2prosser, Handbook of the law of Torts, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, Minn., 1955). 
16 
essential to the preservation of order, dece~cYt 
decorum. and good government in the schools. 
Specifically, the court said: 
The law as we deem it to exist is this: A 
schoolmaster has the right to inflict reasonable 
corporal punishment. 4 
The County Court of Crawford County, Illinois, in 1889, considered 
corporal punishment as assault and battery: 
The court instructs the jury that if a 
teacher, in inflicting punishment upon his 
pupil, ••• he is clearly liable for such ••• 
in criminal prosecution for assault and battery.5 
17 
There are three types of legal actions which can grow out of corporal 
punishment cases: 
1. Criminal action for assault and battery 
brought by the state against the teacher, with the 
end being a penalty against the teacher such as fine 
or imprisonment. 
2. Civil action for assault and battery brought 
against the teacher by parents or guardian of the 
child. 
3. Proceedings against the teacher by the 
school board charging cruelty or incompetency, and 
therefore, grounds for dismissal. 
loLander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859). 
4Lander v. Seaver, supra. 
5Fox v. The People, 84 Ill. App. 270 (1898). 
18 
Assault and Battery 
The Criminal Code of 1961 provides that a person commits assault and 
battery when, without lawful authority, he engages in conduct which places 
another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery,6 and that a person 
commits a battery if he intentionally or knowingly, without legal justifica-
tion, and by any means causes bodily harm to an individual, or makes physical 
contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual. 7 
In People v. Stasg, the court defined an assault as an unlawful attempt, 
8 coupled with the present ability to commit a violent injury upon another. 
An assault and an assault and battery are separate and distinct offen~.;es, 
according to Illinois statute. Any unlawful touching is sufficient to cause 
an assault. 9 An assault may be complete without a battery.lO 
At common law, the least touching of the person of another in anger was 
a battery, for as it has been said, the law cannot draw the line between dif-
ferent degrees of the violence and, therefore, totally prohibits the lowest 
stages of it. ll 
6Illinois Law and Practice (S.H.A.>', Ch. 38 112-1(a). 
7Ibid .,Ch. 38 812-3. 
8people v. Stagg, 194 N.E.2d 342, 29 Ill. 2d 415 (1963). 
9S•H•A• Illinois Statutes, Ch. 38 I 8 55 & 56. 
IOyoung v. People, 6 Ill. App. 434 (1880). 
llHunt v. Peopl(.:, 53 Ill. App. 111 (1893). 
19 
In a situation where more than one person is charged with commission of 
assault and battery, the court has ruled, " •••• While mere presence or negative 
acquiescence is not enough to constitute participation in an assault, circum-
stances may be shown that there is a common design, and in such cases, it is 
not necessary in order to establish an assault and battery, that the person so 
charged should have had actual contact with the victim, since whatever is done 
in fue:Hrance of the design is the act of all, and each is guilty of the 
assault. nl2 
Evidence of Provocation and Justification 
In general, the courts hold that the accused has every right to prove 
that his actions were provoked and just1f1t!d. 
Evidence to prove the accused's defense and to justify his actions is 
/-1 13 
admissible, as is evidence contrary to such matters. The accused is entitled 
to introduce evidence to prove his defense and to show his reasons and justifi-
cation for his acts,14 however, any evidence offered in justification of the 
assault must be relevant to the justification relied on. 15 The prosecution 
12Jaffray v. Hill, 191 tl.E.2d 399, 41 Ill. App2d 460. 
13 6 Corpus Juris Secundum 1122. 
140sborne v. State, 100 So. 365, 87 Fla. 418; Brannon v. State, 115 S.E. 
281, 29 Ga. App. 311; State v. Wilson, 203 P. 351. 
l5peop1e v. Emme, 7 P (2d) 183; Wheeler v. State, 132 N.E.259; Hensley v. 
State, 274 S.W. 135. 
may introduce any relevant, competent evidence to ·asprove the defense for 
16 provocation or justification as established by the accused. 
20 
17 If the evidence as to justification is too remote, or if matter sought 
to be shown in justification or mitigation occurred a sufficient length of time 
1 • 11 18 d before the assault to constitute 'cooling tIme, they cannot be submitte as 
evidence. Also, facts which are learned by the accused after the commission of 
19 
the assault are not adnissible in excusing his acts. 
The question of evidence as provocation and justification regarding the 
remoteness or proximity of the assault was discussed by the courts in the 
following cases. 
In Halcraft v. Grigsb~, the court held that evidence of past conduct was 
not acceptable. The court said: 
Without setting out in detail the excluded evidence, 
suffice it to say all of it, was clearly immaterial and 
had no tendency to prove or disprove any issue made by 
the pleadings. Misunderstandings between the teacher and 
other pupils on her good or ill success in other districts, 
could not possibly be r!6evant in this case, which must 
stand on its own facts. 
In Sheehan v. Sturges, the court laid down the principle that in inflict-
ing punishment, the teacher ~ly take into consideration the pupil's habitual 
disobedience. 21 
16Adams v. State, 75 So. 641, 16 Ala. App. 93. 
17State v. Welch, 278 S.W. 755, 311 Mo. 474. 
18Sexton v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W. 956 (Ky.); State v. Jones, 217 c..W.22. 
19people v. Curtiss, 300 P. 801, 116 Cal. App. (Supp) 771. 
20naycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo. App. 74. 
21 
The Supreme Court of Errors held that the evidence did not establish that 
the corrective actirn taken b:· the teacher against the pupU was unreasonable 
and that evidence as to the temper, character. and past conduct of the student 
was relevant. The court said: 
•••• On the fRBue of temper, character, and past 
conduct of the plaintiff 1n school, if known to the 
def~~n(lant) Wera clcnrl)' ralev;~nt.22 
Tbe Appellate Court of Tillnoi~ stated th~t the past conduct of a pupil 
is clearly relevallt. especially 't.1hare F:uch eonriuct is sedous enough to demand 
special schooling.23 
In the same case, .!!.r~e v • .!h.f!!'l..!!!., the teacher was being sued for assault 
and battery in tnflict{n~ corporal punlghment on a pupil in a correctional 
school for ",tshehnvior t!'1 dac;s. "h,· If'Y!>1ar court of Illinois refused as evi-
dence the mother's letters to the school's principal requesting him to aee if 
anything could be done to _at her Bon to attend school re~ularly and expressed 
her desire that he take whatever steps were necessary to achieve this and 
improve hfA conduct. The Court of Appeals, however. viewed the matter in a fa 
different light. Although the letters were respectively written by the mother 
on January 9th. and February 3rd. of 1938. and the punishment of the boy took 
place in March 24, 1938. the court stated: 
2~An4reozz1~!ubano, 141 A.2d 639 (1958). 
23nra~~~~@!., 33 N.E.2d 889, 310 111. App. 57 (1941). 
When we come to consider the facts as they appear 
in this case. and the question of admissibility of 
evidence - which we have indicated should have been 
admitted to aid the court in determining the question 
involved, rather than l1;'.lting t!! evidence to the 
happenings of March 24, 1938, ••• 
In this case the justification of the punishment .. and the evidence 
22 
admissible thereto, was based upon the pupil·. past conduct and the two letters 
of the mother expressing her consent to whatever action the school authorities 
would take; although both points of justification were remote to actual event 
on which the suit was pending. 
Justification from Relationship of Parties 
The use of reasonable force to compel students to obey, without the 
incurrence of a suit for assault and battery. may be justified on the grounds 
of the relationship of parties. Th~ &e~eral !!le is: Th~ relationsh12 of 
2arties !fY Justify the U8~~f_~~ason~ble force without the ~q~qrrence of 
!iabilitz fo~ assault an( batte!!.25 
The courts have stated the opinion that if from the relationship existing 
between the ~arties, the defend:mt has the right to inflict violence on the 
plaintiff, his acts will not be looked upon as an assault, unless the privilege 
26 11 abused and the violence goes beyond the necessiUes of the case. 
24 prake Ve, Thomas. supra. 
256 £orpua Juris Sec~dum 123. 
26 TresC;,h11.8ll v. Treschmsn. 61 N.E. 961; SampSl..:Il v. Smith, 15 Haas. 365; 
Clausen v. Probs. 95 N.W. 640, 69 Neb. 278. 
23 
The principle of justification from relationship guiding the courts in 
Illinois 1s that the teacher stands in place of the parent to the pupil. The 
common law in Illinois is that at least a portion of parental authority ia 
delegated to the teacher. This relationshi;, places the teacher in a "quasi-
judicialU posit1on; and therefore. the teacher cannot be held liable for an 
error in judgment, unci~r particular conditions, if the punishment exceeds what 
would have reasonable under the circumstances. 27 
The term, tlquas i-judie1a1". is applied to an action which calls for dis-
cretion of public administrative offieers, who are required to investigate 
facts, or ascertain the existence of facts and draw conclusions from them, as 
a basis for official action~ and to exercise diseretion of a judicial ne!ure. 28 
Some courts have stated: 
••• and he Is guilty of assault if he inflicts punishment 
which in the general judgment of reasonable men, aft~§ 
thought and reflection would call clearly excessive. 
Hov.ve~, the c~n l~w.in I~llnois will !~ant the teacher the benefit of 
the doubt for, an error 1]1 judgt!lent if ~lt.e~e is a clear absence of malice in 
!f!Ot:lv~. or intent, and no perpunent injury ,rp'sul~s ,frOt!J the punishment,_ 
27FOX v. nle People, supra.; Drake v. Thomas. supra. 
28Black. ~. cit. 
29!!tnldc v. St:~, 26 N.E. 777, 127:nd. 490; S,t.t. v. Spiegel. 270 P. 
1064, 39 Wyo. 309, 64 A.L.R. 289. 
24 
The Law of Torts 
It is a well established principle of the law of torts that corporal 
punishment which is reasonable in degree and which is administered by a teacher 
to a pupil as a disciplinary measura, is privileged in the sense that the 
administration of such a form of punishment does not gtve rise for civil action 
against a teacher.30 
"Tort, n is derived from Latin meaning to twist, twisted, or wrested aside. 
According to Black. a tort 1s a private or civil wrong or injury, a wrong 
independent of a contract; or it is a violation of a duty imposed by general 
law or otherwise upon all pers{)nB occupying the relation to each other which i8 
involved in a given transaction. There must always be a violation of some duty 
owing to plaintiff, and generally such a duty must arise by operation of law 
and not be mere agreement of the parties. Three elements in every tort action 
are: 
1. Existence of legal duty of defendant to plaintiff; 
2. Breach of duty; 
3. Damage a8 proximate result. 
A legal wrong committed upon the person o~~ property independent of contract may 
be either (1) a direct violation I invasion of some legal right of the individ-
ual; (2) the infraction of some public duty by which special damage accrues to 
~he individual; (3) the violation of some private obUgation by which 11ke 
30Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So.2d 49, 43 A.L.R. 464; Swigart v. 
Ballou, 106 111. App. 266 (1903) (rule supported by implication); Drake v. 
~omaa. 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.~.d 889. 
25 
damage accrues to the individual. In the former rase, no special damage is 
'ecessary to entitle the part to recover. In the two latter cases such damage 
is necessary. 31 
Prosser defines a tort as a term applied to a miscellaneous and more or 
less unconnected group of civil wrongs, other than breach of contract, for 
which a court cf law will afford a remedy in the form of an action for damages. 
The law of torts is concerned with the compensation of losses suffered by 
private individuals in their legally protected interests, through conduct ~~ 
32 
others which is regarded as socially unreasonable. 
Prosser then goes on to distinguish bctt\l'een criminal proceedings and 
civil proceeding in a tort action. 
Criminal Responsibility and Civil Liability 
The injured party may bring a civil action of tort to recover compensa-
tion for the damage he has suffered. The state brings criminal proceedings to 
protect the interests of the public against the wrongdoer. The same act may b 
alt:!.ough not necessarily, both a tort against an individual and a crime against 
the state. In such cases, the accused may be subject to both civil action in 
tort and criminal prosecution. 33 
In cases of torts which are considered aggr.avated, the purposes of the 
criminal laws are sometimes effected in the tort action by an award of punitive 
damages. 34 
31 Black. Ope C1t. 
32 Prosser, p.l. 
33Ib1d. 
26 
A criminal prosecution is not seeking a compensation of the injured party 
against whom the wrong is committed. and his only part in it is that of an 
accuser and a witness for the state. So far as the criminal law is concerned, 
35 he will leave the courtroom empty-handed. 
The civil action for a tort is begun and maintained by the injured 
person himself, and its purpose is to obtain damages for compensation he has 
coming to him from what he has suffered at the expense of tile accused. If he 
is successful, he receives a judgment of a sum of money, which be may enforce 
by collecUng it from the defendant. The state may never sue in tort in its 
real or governmental authority, although as the owner of property, it may 
resort to the same tort actioh as any individual to recover for injuries to the 
property. 36 
The s~~e act of tort may be both a crime against the state and a tort 
against the individual. 37 
In reaching a balance between the individual and the social interests 
involved in tort cases, the courts have been influenced not only by the weight 




37 Ibid. p. 7 B2. 
27 
a. The r10ral Aspect of the defendant's conduct; 
b. The historical development of the law; 
c. The possible prevention of further torts. 38 
The motive or purpose behind the defendant's conduct plays a predominant 
part in many questions of tort liability. The defendant's liability then will 
depend usually, upon the importance and social value attached to his objective!! 
balanced against the x.ature of the plaintlfe s interests and the extent of the 
30 harm to them. -' 
Criteria of Tort in Corporal Punishment 
In the case of Tinkham v. Kole, the court followed a criteria of tort in 
corporal punishment: 
a. Teacher's motive in administering discipline; 
h. Nature of pupil's misconduct; 
c. Heans of administering punishment; and, 
d. Extent of re~ulting injury to pupil. 40 
In .Suits Y, •• Glover, the court add: 
But a teacher'a right to use physical punishment is 
a limited one. His immunity from liability in damages 
requires that the evidence shoY that the punishment was 
reasonable, and such a showing requires consideration of 
the nature of the punishment itself, the nature of the pupil's 
38r~id. p.12 §3; p.14 14. 
39Ibid • p. 21, 85. 
40Tlnkham v. Kole, 110 N.W.2d 258 (1961). 
misconduct which gave rise· to the punishment, the age 
and physical condition of the child, and the teacher's 
motive in inflicting the punishment. If consideration 
of all these factors indicates that the teacher violated none 
of the standards Implic~t in each of them~ then he ~ill 
be held free of liability; but it seemaliability will 
result from proof that the teacher, in administering the 
punishment, violated anyone of these standards.41 
28 
The first of the four factors in determining whether corporal punishment 
administered by teacher to pupil, namely, the teacher's motive, will be con-
sidereu under "motive end intent." The latter three will be discussed as 
factors of "reasonableness." 
The courts have held that in the matter of corporal punishment the 
teacher's motive in administering the discipline must be consldered. 42 
lbere is substantial evidence which stands undisputed 
that the defendant strud'- plaintiff several times on both 
sides of the head and this was aone in anger. The finding 
is warranted. The b0I' 51 eardrum was ruptured and the 
injury was permanent. 3 (Emphasis added). 
nle principle stated in the Restatement to the Law of Torts reads as 
follows: 
Force applied or confinement imposed for any 
purpose other than th~ proper training or education 
of the child or for the preservation of discipline is 
not privileged although appUed or imposed in an amount 
and upon an occassion which would be privileged had it 
been applied for such a purpos~.44 
41Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449. 71 So.2d 49 (1954). 
42pox v. The P~oal~, supra.; prake v. Tho~. supra. 
43orinkhap. v. Kol.e. supra. 















The use of force upon a child is privileged only if applied or imposed 
for the purpose of either correcting the child, thereby improving his charac-
ter, or of compelling obedience to proper commands. If force is used for any 
other purpose, as to satisfy Ii violent antipathy taken by a school master to 
his pupil, it is not privileged ,:"ven though the offense is of the nature which 
\iould justify the punishment. If it were inflicted upon the child for the 
proper purpose of correcting its faults, it would mold his character and be 
for his own goou. 45 
Illinois courts have held that intent of malice is the essential element 
in tort cases of assault and battery. The intention to harm the person as-
saulted is the essence of an assault and battery,46 but, this statement should 
be restricted to assaults committed in the course of performing lawful, rather 
than unlawful, acts, since it is a known rule that in an action for assault, if 
the occasion the injury is unlawful, the intent of the wrongdoer is immaterial. 7 
Civil liability is incurred if the act occasioning tbe injury is unlawful 
The intent then is immaterial. 48 
45Restatement to the Law of Torts, p. 350 1151. 
46Gllmore v. Fuller, 65 N.E. 84, 198 Ill. 130, 60 L.R.A. 286; In re 
Murphy. 109 Ill. 31 (1884); In re Sxmser, 182 Ill. App. 208; Drya18ki v. Thiele 
163 Ill. App. 290 (1911); Solomon v. Buchele, 127 Ill. App. 420 (1906). 
47Paxton v. Boxer, 67 Ill. 132, 16 Am. R. 615; Johnson v. Englehardt, 
256 Ill. App. 557 (1930); ~icho118 v. Colw{:11, 113 Ill. App. 219 (1903). 
48Smith v. Moran, 193 N.E.2d 466, 43 Ill. App.2d 373 (1963). 
30 
However, where a person inflicts Ml injury on another is not a wron~doer, 
and his action which results in the injury is not of itself unlawful. the 
intent becotlleS material;49 or of criminal negligence:. the law implies the 
necessary intent. 50 
NaHce is defined as the intentional doing of a wrongful act wi thou! 
just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury or under the circum-
51 
stances that the law will imply an evil intent. This implied malice is 
inferred by legal reasoning and necessary deduction from the ~ gestol 
(conduct o~ the party). Malice may be inferred from any deliberate act which 
52 is cruel, committed by one person against another, however sudden. 
A teacher. who prompted by revenge, inflicts corporal punishment is as 
guilty criminally as if he acted w~th malice.53 
Malice may be inferred from excessive punishment, according to the court 
in State v. Thornton, but wher~ the punishment administered is not of itself 
immoderate, hs illegality or its legality must depend entirely on the guo 
!l~ with which it was administered. 54 Illinois courts reject th'" thenry of 
implying malice in a teacher's ~ction unless there results a permanent injury.5 
49paxton v. Boye..!:. 67 Ill. 132 (1873); Hitzelberger v, Kanter, 181 Ill. 
App. 459 (1913); Nicholls v. Colwell, 113 Ill. App. 219 (1903). 
50 Land v. Bachman, 223 Ill. App. 473 (1921). 
5lBlack, QE.. Cit. 
52Nicholls v. Colwell, supra. 
53 State v. TIlornton, 48 S.E. 602, 136 N.C. 610. 







The court in Commonwealth v. Ebert said, that a school teacher is in 
loco parentis to the scholars;56 therefore,has the partial right of a parent 
to discipline the pupil and, if necessary, punish the child. In Melen v. 
McLaughlin the court said that if the punishment is excessive or cruel, and 
beya'ld that required by circumstances, the teacher is liable for an assault, 
from which liability he is not relieved by the fact that he acted in good fait • 
5 Excessive punishment refers to a situation where the punishment is questioned. 
Improper punishment refers to a situation where the infliction of punishment a 
all or the type of punishment inflicted, as distinguished from the extent 
58 thereof, is questioned. 
It is not necessary that the injury in the precise form in which it in 
fact resulted should have been foreseen, but it is sufficient, if by the exer-
cise of reasonable care, the teacher may have foreseen that some injury might 
result from his act. 
The Court in Commonwealth v. Ebert said, that a teacher is in loco 
parentis to the scholars, and the same rules of law which are applicable to 
parental responsibility and parental control are applicable to the teacher, 
however, 
5~elen v. McLaughlin, (Vt.) 176 A. 297. 
57Black, ~. Cit. 
58Ibid • 
•••• He may not, ••• inflict punishment maliciously, 
that is, out of spite, hatred. or ill will, nor out of 
a mere desire to inflict pain in order to humiliate a 
pupil. 
In the infliction of such punishment, where he acts 
conscientiously and from motives of duty, he acts in a 
judicial capacity and is not liable for errors in 
judgment, even though the punishment seems unreasonably 
severe. But when the punishment seems unreasonable and 
he acts malo animo, from wicked motives, under the 
influence of an unsocial heart, he is liable civilly and 
criminally. 59 
32 
The cou1-t' s use of the term, "malo animo," is another way of saying wi ~ h 
an evil mind; with a bad purpose or wrongful intention; with malice. 
In this matter of determining intent of the teacher,the court 1n Lander ,. 
Seaver said: 
Customary mildness and moderation of a teacher is not 
admissible upon the question as to whether the punishment 
inflicted by him in a particular case was excessive or not, 
but it is admissible in regard to whether the punishment 
was wanton and malicious. 60 
The courts are not in agreement on this point of implied malice. One 
group holds that excessiveness implies malice. The other group holds that the 
teacher is not liable for an error in judgment if there is no permanent injury 
it will not otherwise imply malice. 6l 
~e courts in Il1inoi8 have considered the motive and intent of the 
teacher to be the essence of innocence or guilt in 2assing judgment on cases 
59Commonwealth v. Ebert, 11 Fa. Diet. 199 (1901). 
60Lander v. Seaver. 32 Vt. 114; 76 Am. D. 156. 








involving corporal punishment of children where there was no permanent injury. 
There have been three such cases litigated in (111n018: Fox~The Pe021e, 
84 Ill. App. 210 (1899); ~wigart _v" ~allo,!, 106 Ill. App. 226 (:..903): Drake v. 
!homa9~ 310 Ill. App. 57. 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941.). 
On November 19, 1897, Medford Fox, a teacher, punished nine year old 
Palmer Seaney by whipping him w1th a switch about the size of an ordinary lead 
pencil about twenty inches lon~. The punishment was inflicted for alleged 
mi8c~duct during the noon hour the previous day. The trial court found the 
teacher guilty of assault and battery. The court of appeals rejected the 
instructions which the trial court gave the jury. The rejected instructions 
were as follows: 
The court instructs the jury that if a teacher in 
inflicting punishment upon his pupil, goes beyond reason-
able castigation, and either in mode or degree of cor-
rection, is guilty of any unreasonable and dispropor-
tionate violence or force, he is clearly liable for such 
excess in a criminal prosecution for assault and battery. 
The court instructs the jury that unreasonable and 
excessive use of force on the person of another being 
proved, the wrongful intent is a necessary and legitimate 
conclusion in all cases, when the act was designedly 
cormnitted ll and it then becomes an assault, because 
purposely inflicted without justification or excuse. 
And if you believe from eVidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. that the defendant has made use of excessive and 
unreasonable force in inflicting the punishment, ••• the 
jury should find the defendant guilty.62 




















festation of "prejudicial error," and held that the principle appUcable in .; 
this case was one cited from the American and 
(Vol. 21~ p. 769). 
. 
The authority of the teacher over his pupil being 
regarded as a delegation of at least a portion of the 
parental authority" the presumption is in favor of the 
correctness of the teacherts action in inflicting 
corporal punishment upon the pupil. The teacher must 
not have been actuated by malice,. nor have inflicted the 
punishment wantonly. For an error in judgment, although 
the punishment is unnecessarily excessive, if it 1s not 
of a nature to cause lasting injury. and he acts in good 
falth, the teacher is not liable.63 
34 
The court in the Drake case in Illinois cited the same passage with this 
statement: 
The rule of the above citation, as called to our 
attention. is necessarily the rule, for a teacher stands 
in loco parentis. This rule is applicable to the facts 
in this case •••• 64 
The criteria by which the court in Illinois will judge the liability of 
the actions of a teacher viII be: 
1. The teacher stands in loco parentis. therefore 
a portion of parental authority Is delegated to her. 
2. The Court will presume the correctness of the 
teacher's action. provided: 
a) She was not actuated by malice. 
t:) Punishment was not inflicted wantonly. 
c) Punishment is not of a nature to cause 
lasting injury. 
3. The Court will not hold a teacher liable for an 
error in judgment if the punishment 1s excessive, 
provided she acted in good faith. 
In IllinoiB, therefore, the Court will not accept the theory of implied 
malice because the punishment was excessive. The Court has granted the teache 
63Supra• 






the benefit of the doubt for an error in judgment, where it was clearly eviden 
that the intent was not malicious and l~anton so as to cause permanent injury. 
Section 148 in &estatement to th~8W of_~~ts states the following in 
regard to excessive force: 
One other than a parent t who. in vTho1e or in part, 
is in charge of the edcation or training of a child is 
not privileged to apply any force or impose any confinement 
which 1s unreasonable either, 
(a) as being disproportionate to the offense 
for which the child is being punished, or 
(b) as not being reasonably necessary and 
appropriate to compel obedience to a 
proper command.65 
One of the most important factors in determining whether the punishment 
inflicted was reasonable 1s a consideration of a comparison between the harsh-
ness of the punishment and the weight of the offense for which it is inflh'{'ed.6 
In determining '"hether a force or confinement 1s reasonahle when used to 
compel obedience of a child by the person in charge of him, three factors are 
important: 
1. The character of the command as being one 
obedience to which is necessary for the proper training 
or ed1 cat1on of a chUd. To determine this, the 
following must be taken into account: 
a. where the entire training, 8'" distinguished 
merely from the education of a child, is in 
the charge of the actor; 
b. of the desirability of inculcating in the 
child the habits of obedience to commands 
of those who are in authority over him 
which are not obviously improper. 
65Restatement to the Law of Torts, 8148, p. 347. 
66Ibid. 
2. The necessity of the actor using the particular 
means which he adopts in order to compel the child to 
obey his commands. The ques tion ari ',es as to ~lltether: 
a. there has been an excessive means of 
carrying out the purpose for ~<lhich the 
privilege is given, 
b. the actor is not privileged to use a 
means to compel obedience if a less 
severe method is likely to secure obedience. 
3. The character of the cOll'l:".iand and the importance 
of both the present welfare and future training or 
education of a child of his obedience to it. 67 
Section 149 of the same source states: 
One other than a parent who has been given by 
law or has voluntarily assumed, in whole or in part, 
the parental function of training or educating a 
child, or one to whom the parent has delegated such 
training or education, is not privileged to inflict 
upon a child a punishment which is degrading in 
character or which is liable to cause serious or 
permanent harm. 68 
In other words, a punishment which is obviously detrimental and not 
JG 
beneficial to the chUd as adult, or one which is degradL1;; so as to injure th 
child's self-respect is not for the benefit of the child. 
The factors involved in determining the reasonableness of punishment are 
stated in Section 150: 
In determining whether a punishment is excessive. the 
nature of the offense, the apparent motive of the offender, 
the influence of his example upon other children of the same 
fam.ily or group, the sex, the age, and physical and mental 
condition of a child ••• 69 
67Ibid. 
68Ibid. sec.l49, p.348. 
691b1d. 1150, p.349. 
37 
I.iability cannot be incurred due to resul t~ from reasonal>le punish!nent 
upon a child ~fhose nhY'3ical weal~nec;s Wl'!.~ not kllmm. 70 
reasQnableness of corporal punishment, not only the acts of the pupil which 
were the immediate cause of the r'unishment arf> to be consi"Jerecl, hut in additi(l 
evidence should be admitted of the nupil' s nlH!t conduct. 71 
The pupil under di.scussion "1">11:113 R bip; bo~r, 15 years of age, and weighing 
about 200 pounds. He had been given u" as incorrigible at the 13n tsy Ross 
School and hi!: own mother requested that he be transff'!rred to Mosely," a 
correctional school. 
In admitUng evidence of pupU's past conduct the court said: 
There are other citati.ons of authorities that were 
passed upon by the courts in the various states regarding 
the rule that must be applied to a pupil who has been 
charged with acts of misconduct; among these are Sheehan v. 
§turg~. 53 Conn. 481, ? A.MI, cited upon t:.11!1 question, 
where the court approved that action of a teachr.~ in 
whipping a student who had violated the rules of the 
school. The court there also approved of admitting in 
evidence past acts of misconduct in determining whether 
a teacher acted reasonably in administedng punishment. 
Our attention is also called to Heritage v. Dodge, 64 N.H. 
297~ !f A. 722. 
When we come to consider the facts af they appear in 
this case, and the question of admissibility of evidence, 
which ••• aid the court in determf.ning the question involved, 
rather than l1mitin~ the evidence to the happenings of 
March 24, 1938 ••• "7 
70Quinn v. Nolan, 4 W. L. Bull. 81, Ohio (1879). 
71Drake v. ~oma8, supra. 






Prosser) .The T'~.2J:.....19..rts_, holds that in consirler1np, the reasonableness 
of corporal punishment SUMS it up lIS aU of th~ circumstances surroundinp, it 
must be brought into the picture, incluninp" the nature of the ~ffense. the 
age, the sex and the stren~th of a child. his past behavior, the kind of 
i h d d 73 pun 8 ment. an the extent of the hann inflicte • 
It is eveIJ"'.;rhere aRreed upon that the teacher may administer corporal 
punishment which is reasonal-le and l<.rhere school board rer,ulations do not 
prohibit it. The courts of this country are divided upon the qu(!stion ~ho 
shall judge wlen the punishment inflicted has been reasonable: the teacher, 
because of her quasi-judicial capacity? or the jury?74 
The 1mV' ar,rees that in the absence of statutory provisions, the common 
law rule upholds the person standinR in loco parentis in administerinp, corr~ral 
punishment. 
In E~o£~e~~Curtiss, the Appellate Department, Superior Court of Cali-
fomia, cited two schools of legal thought on what constitutes reasonableness 
in corporal punishment and ,,,ho was to judge if it was so: 
One group makes the teacher the arbiter. and 
dee lares all punishments to be reasonable which does 
not result in the disfigurement of or perJl"anen,t 
injury to the chi ld a.d which is n,ot inflicted 
maliciously. The .l~lt cla.!!pJ.!~!!.S_ on this subject 
seems to be State v. P~nftergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Devereux 
and Battle's-Law). 365, 31 A~-J)ec. 416. 75 
73prosser, ~. ~. p.114. 
74J_llinoi~ Review, 26: p.8lS. 
7S?eople v. Curtiss, supra. 
The second group ••• and the one which to our mind, 
expresses the more enlightened view--a view more 
consonant with modern ideas relatiug to the relation-
ship between parents or those standing in their place 
and children--refuses to make the teacher the sole 
arbiter. The courts deciding these cases hold that 
both the reasonableness of, and the necessity for, 
the punishment is to be determined by a jury, under 
the circumstances of each case. This rule is expressed 
in Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640. 76 
Thus, according to the line of thought in the second group of cases, 
39 
there is a clear-cut line of thought or distinction between decisions which 
give the power of judgment to the teacher and those which give the power to 
the jury. "The court follows the'more enlightened view' in interpreting the 
word 'justifiable in the minds of reasonable men.,n77 
This difference of views is more apparent than real, as both doctrines 
express nearly the same point of view; that is, the teacher-arbiter doctrine 
is not as tyrannical as it sounds, nor is the jury-arbiter doctrine as 
restricting upon the teacher's discretion as it seems. The courts have never 
really recognized the teacher-arbiter doctrine in view of the quasi-judicial 
capacity which she occupies, to the extent of summarily dismissing a case of 
I 
this nature. In reality, all such case~ h.ve ueen decided by judge or jury.78 J 
Bishop's "just doctrine," which is applied to parents is equally appli-
cable to the teacher: 
76people v. Curtiss, supra. 
77Hunter, Illinois Law Review, p. 816. 
78Ibid. 
.I , 
The "just doctrine tf would seem to consist of a 
compromise between the differing views thus stated; as 
that the parental judgnlllnt, if hon\rst. without passion 
or malice, should be taken as prima facie establishing 
the right, and should be overcome only from evidence of 
passion, of malice, of the use of an improper weapon, 
or of such excessive severity as implies the absence of 
true parental love, or of a due appreciation of parental 
duty. 2 Bbhop "Criminal Law sec. 886. 79 
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In substance, then, both doctrines conform to Bishop's "just doctrine." 
The Illinois court in Swigart v. Ballou, 1903, held by implication, the 
view that whether a particular punishment was. under the circumstances reason-
able, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.80 However, the 
Illinois Court, as we have previously noted. will not imply malice because the 
punishment was excessive, but will grant the teacher the benefit of the doubt 
for an error in judgment. This benefit will only be accorded if there is a 
clear absence of malice, and an absence of permanent injury. 
R. R. Hamilton in The NatiQQal School Law Reporter, ~+es this comment: 
••• this presumption in the teacher's favor disappears 
if the pupil introduces evidence that the teacher has 
violated anyone of the standards set out in the Glover case. 
It would be a rare case in which there would be no evidence 
a jury could reasonably believe to the effect that a 
standard had been violated. ,"':~', Pl-".(~tical matter, if a 
teacher is taken to court he will marshall all the evl,;ence 
he has to prove that he has violated no standard. He would 
not, ••• rely exclusively upon a favorable presumption, which 
is rebuttal. 81 
The teacher 1. supposed to act as a reasonable person. His actions will 
be judged by reasonable persons. In Illinois, the reasonable persons who will 
79Ib:l.d. t p.817. 
8OSw:l.gart v. Ballou, 106 Ill. App. 226. 
SIR. R. Hamilton. "Corporal Punishment," The National School Law Reporter 
(XII No.3. March 27 1962) 
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judge if the teacher acted as a reasonable man, will either be the judge, and 
in most cases, the jury. What it a "reasonaiJle person"? 
Prosser describes the reasonable person as: 
The standard required of an individual is that of 
the supposed conduct, under similar circumstances, of 
a hypothetical person, the reasonable man. He has 
ordinary prudence and represents a community ideal of 
reasonable behavior. The characteristics of this 
imaginary person include: 
a. Physical attributes of the actor himself. 
b. Normal intelligence and mental capacity. 
c. Normal perception and memory and a minimum 
of experience and information, common to 
all the community. 
d. Such superior skill and knowledge as the 
actor has or holds himse1f8~ut as having 
when he undertakes to act. 
In accepting the doctrine of "presumption of reasonableness," the 
Illinois Courts will presume that the teacher acted as a reasonably prudent 
person,83 but, the teacher has the burden of proving this fa~t.84 
The court, in Patterson v. Nutter, held that if the punishment is not 
clearly excessive in the judgment of reasonable men, the teacher is not civilly 
liable for inflicting the same. 85 
The Supreme Court of Iowa in 1961, held a teacher liable i~r atriking 
the face of a pupil several times with his hand. The pupil allegedly had been 
82prosser, ~. Cit., 131, p. 124. 
83 Drake v. Thomas, supra. 
84Swigart v. Ballou, supra. 









slow in removing another pupil's glove that fit rather tightly, from his own 
hands. A doctor later determined that the pu~11 had suffered a punctured ear-
drum as a result of the blows from the teacher. The re11ult of the injury was 
permanent. The court said: 
••• it has frequently been said that the test for 
reasonableness being determined is whether the punish-
ment was excessive in the judgment of reasonable men. 86 
The courts do not consider corporal punishment to be a form of negli-
gence. Ordinary negligence does not figure in an action for assault and 
87 battery. 
• •• an assault and battery is not negligence. The 
former is intentional; the latter is unintentional ••• " 
••• THE OOCTRINE OF CONTR.IBUTORY NEGLIGENCE HAS NO 
APPLICATION in an action for assault and battery. 88 
Although the form for assault and battery is trespass, the proOf and its 
effects may depend on the principles of negligence and on what was proper care 
for the defendant under the circumstances.89 
8~inkham v. Kole, supra. 
87 Donner v. Grasp, 115 N.W. 125, 134 Wis. 523. 
8~uter v.~, 46 Iowa 132. 
896 COrPus Juris Sesundum Ill. 
CHAPTER IV 
LEGAL POSITION OF THE TEACHER 
The purpose of this chapter will be to defLe the legal position of the 
teacher according to (1) the principle of immunity; (2) the doctrine of loco 
parentis; (3) the limitations placed on the teacher's authority; and, (4) the 
protection of her position as a teacher. 
The law of torts has established the rule that a teacher is immune from 
liability for physical punishment when it 1s reasonable in degree; the right 
to immunity is a limited one. 
A teacher's immunity from civil liability for reasonable chastisement 
administered to a pupil results from judicial recognition that as a teacher, 
ahe stands in loco parentis and shares, in~ofar as matters relating to school 
discipline are concerned, the parent's right to use moderate force to obtain 
the child's obedience. 
For example, the court said in Stevens v. Fasset (27 Me., 266, 1847). 
that the right of a parent to keep h1s chUd in order and obedi,mce is secured 
by the common law, and he may correct his child, being under age, in a 
reasonable manner, for the benefit of his education; a parent may also delega 
a part of his parental authority to the teacher of his child who 1& then 1n 
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loco parentis. He has such portion of the power of the parent as may be 
necessary to ans~Jer the purpose for which hE: is employed. I 
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The courts admit to a general rule in the teache~'s right of privilege 
in the administration of corporal punishment: 
It is a well-establish~d principle of the law of 
torts that corporal punishment which is reasonable in 
degree and which is administered to a pupil as a 
disciplinary measure is "privileged" in the sense that 
the administration of such punishment does not give 
rise to a c~use of action for damages against the teacher. 2 
Black defines "privilege" as a particular and peculiar benefit or advan-
tage enjoyed by a person, company, or class~ beyond the common advantage of 
other citizens; and exceptional or extraordinary power or exemption. It is a 
right, power, or franchise, immunity held by a person or a class, against or 
beyond the course of the law. 3 
The rrestatement to the Law of Torts gives the following general principle 
8 147. One other than a parent who has been 
given by law or who has voluntarily assumed in 
whole or in part the parental function of training 
or educating a child or one whom the parent has 
delegated such training, is pri~lileged to apply such 
reasonable force. 4 
This privilege of inmrunity from civil liability is extendHl to the teache 
by the common law. The court will uphold the privilege providea it would be 
lStevens v. Fasset, 43 A.L.R. 469, 473 (1847). 
2Suits v. Glover, supra. 
3Black, .Q:2.. Cit. 
4Restatement to the Law of Torts, Sec. 147. 
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considered as reasonable ir. the judgment of prudent men. This point is agreed 
upon by all the courts. The courts disagret on who composes the body of 
prudent men--the teacher or the jury. Illinois leaves the question of such 
determination to the jury.5 
The Illinois Courts give the fcllowing statement on each of the above 
points: 
gtatement of Privilege o{ Immunity 
••• agree that neither parent nor a person in loco 
parentis is ordinarily liable to an unemancipated 
minor child in his c~arge for corporal punishment 
inflicted by way of discipline or correction. Foley v. 
Fole!. 61 Ill. ApI'. 577 (1895). 
On Motive of Teacher 
•••• The teacher must not be actuated by malice 
or inflict punishment wantonly. For an error in 
judgment. although the punishment is unnecessarily 
excessive. if it is not of a nature to cause lasting 
injury, and he acts in good faith, the teacher is not 
liable. Fox v. The People, supra. 
On Extent of Harm 
•••• The very nat~re of the rule which accords to 
a teacher the privilege to physically punish a pupil 
makes it clear that where it is sought to hold a teacher 
liable in damages for such punishment administered to a 
pupil, the crucial question is the reasonableness of the 
punishment. Swigart v. Ballou, supra. 
5Swigart v. Ballou, supra. 
On Jury to Determine Rea8onablenes~ 
The courts are in harmony holding that a particular 
punishment administer-en, W:lS under the facts and circum-
stances, reasonable, is a question of fact to be determined 
by the _1u-ry. S,!i~~:.......Balt~, supra. 
On Delegation ~f Paren~al Authority 
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•••• A teacher's authority over his pupils being 
regarded as a delegation of at least a portion of parental 
authority, "resumption is in favor of the teacher's action •••• 
Drake v. Thomas •• supra. 
The courts have always ~"'lcognlzed the need to control the conduct of 
students and considers it a breach of duty if such control is lacking. In 
imposing this obligation upon the teacher, the court has granted her a unique 
position of authority: 
•••• By law, 88 well as by immemorial usage, a school-
master is regarded as standing in loco parentis, ~nd, like a 
parent has authority to moderately chastise the pupils under 
his care. One standing in loco parentis--exercising a parent's 
delegated authority--may administer reasonable chastisement 
to a child, or a pupil. to the same extent as a parent. The 
parent is not criminally liable in all cases, merely because 
in opinion of a jury or a court, the punishment inflicted is 
iumoderate or excessive. 1'101·-;-: ':',ha~ t1:1s 18 necessary to 
fasten upon him guilt of criminality.o 
The court holds that one in loco parentis 1s in place of d parent; 
charged factlcious1y. with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities. 7 
An even more expansive definition of 1n loco parentis was given by the 
court in CommonF-ealth v. Ebert: 
6~obers~ v. State~ 116 So. 317. 22 Ala. App. 413 (1928). 
7Heisner v. U.S., D. C. Mo., 295 F. 866, 868. 
•••• To render a parent liable to prosecution by his 
mlnor child, he must be governed by motives of malice or 
unkindness. For a mere error in judgment, i::lfluenced 
perhaps by fond parental love for the future prosperity of 
his child, he cannot be he IJ legally Uab Ie. The law does 
not permit the court to enter the sanctity of the domestic 
circle and usurp the parentd authority in every family 
because we think the punishment is seve~e. It is strong 
reason to believe that the parent is actuated by bad 
and malevolent motives, using his legal parental;.uthority 
for the gratification of a mind bent on mischief that the 
law has given the right to interpose for the protection and 
safety of the child. Such is the rule relative to the school 
teacher, whom the parent for the time being, has placed in his 
8 stead ••• 
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A teacher punished his pupil by "striking him a number of times on his 
rump and legs with a one-half inch rubber syphon hose." In upholding that the 
chastisement of the pupil by the teacher was lawful and reasonable under the 
circumstances, the court said: 
It will be noticed that the same rule applies to a 
teacher as to a parent, and I am sure that, if the father 
or mother of this boy had done just what this teacher did 
and had been arrested, there would not have been a convietion. 9 
The parent has the natural right over his child, but for purposes of 
education and training, he may delegate a portion of this right to another. It 
is within his right to restrict this privilege to a certain degne when he 
chooses a private school rather than a public school, but he cannot limit the 
10 policy of the State. TI'e common law in Illinois restricts the authority of 
the teacher to "at least a portion of parental authority.tlll 
8Commonwealth v. Ebert, 11 Pa. Dist. 199 (1901). 
9Sup~. 
10Restatement to the Law of Torts, Vol 1, 1153. 
llFox v. The PeopJe, supra.; Drake v. Thomas. supra. 
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"Teacher," in the State of Illinois, means any or all school dis trict 
employees required to be certified under the laws relating to the certificatio 
12 
of teachers. 
The court has held that under proper circumstances, a member of the 
school board may use sufficient force to remove a pupil from the school room. l 
But, the court in Prendergast v. Masterson, held that a superintendent is not 
a teacher and therefore, has not the right to discipline students. The court 
said: 
•••• 1) that there was nothing in the rules of the 
school board which authorized defendant as superintendent 
to take control of the high school to the exclusion of 
the teachers therein; 2) if, as superintendent, defendant 
was a public officer, he did not thereby have a right to 
chastise plaintiff, since such a right was not conferred 
by law on any public officer as such; and, 3) if the custom 
was for the superintendent of schools to chastise pupils, 
therein, the custom existed in violation not only of well-
established principles of law, but in violation of a criminal 
statue denouncing as a crime the use of unlawful violence 
upon another. l4 
The reasoning behind the common law principle which permits the parent 
to limit the privilege of one in loco parentis seems to be explained by the 
court in Steber v. Norris: 
This parental power is little liable to abuse, for it 
is continually restrained by natural affection, the tender-
ness which the parent feels for his offspring, an affection 
ever on the alert, and acting rather by instinct than reasoning. 
l2School Code, 124-1, p.232. 
13peck v. Smith, 41 Conn. 442. 
14Co;pu8 Juris Secundum, 123; Prendergast v. Masterson, 196 S.W. 2466 
(Tex. Civ. App.). 
The schoolmaster has no such natural restraint. Hence. he 
may not safely be trusted with all a parent'. authority, for 
he does not act from instinct of parental affection. He 
should be guided and restrained by j~idgment and wise dl!§retion, 
and hence 1s responsible for their reasonable exercise. 
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A third person may be l~gally authorized by the parent to administer 
such chastisement to their children as they might themselves lawfully inflict. 
This point was made by the court in Rowe v. Rugs: 
It is a general rule that those having the care, 
custody and control of minor cllildren may, for the purpose 
of proper diSCipline and control, administer such moderate 
and reasonable chastisement as shall effect the desired 
object, and this rule has been applied generally to all 
those occupying a position in loco parentis. 
The duties which the parent owes to the child, as well 
as to the public, in the matter of its maintenance, protection, 
and education, have generally been held to give the parents or 
other person occupying such a place, the power to thus 
discipline and correct It. 16 
The Court of Apprl"nls in Illinois considered a mother's two letters 
requesting action to be taken to correct her son as an express delegation of 
parental authority, and declared that the lower court erred in refusing these 
letters as evidence. 17 In this case, the parent chose, unwittingly, to grant 
to the school principal and teachers her expressed consent in any course of 
reasonable action. It has thus become a point of common law in the State of 
Illinois, that a teacher is not liable in civil action when the delegatlon« 
such parental authority has been 80 expressed. 
lSSteber v. Norrts~ 188 Wis., 206 N.W. 173; 43 A.L.R. 501. 
16aowe v. Rugg. 91 N.W. 903: 117 Iowa 606. 94 A.S.R. 318 (1902). 
170rake v. Thoma., supra. 
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One point of common law which is peculiar to the State of Illinois is 
that the burden of proof of reasonableness rests with the teacher. 
The case came before the Illinois Appellate Court in IQ03. Mary Ballou. 
a teacher, had whipped a student with a stick for misbehaving a number of time • 
The county court acquitted her, but the pupil's counsel brought the case into 
the Appellate Court. The decision of the trial court was reversed. The Court 
said: 
In the State of Illinois, the burden of proof of the 
whipping being moderate and not excessive lies with the 
teacher, not with the boy. The jury was not so instructed, 
therefore, the judgment is reversed. The rule is that 
where the defendant, a teacher in this case, pleads moderate 
castigavit and the plaintiff retlled de injuria, the burden 
of proof is upon the defendant. 8 
The School Code of Illinois is silent on the matter of corporal punish-
ment. It has no direct or indirect statutes affecting corporal punishment, 
either prohibiting it or permitting it. The State of Illinois has no statute 
which places the teacher in loco parentis. 
The Illinois Constitution of 1870, Article IV 822 states: 
The General Assembly shall not pass laws in any of 
the following enumerated cases, that is to say: for--*** 
Providing for the management of common schools; 
The matter of discipline policy is delegated to the local school boards. 
Their rules and regulations must he obeyed as having the force of ordinances. 
Violation of these rules by the teacher may result in her dismissal. 19 Before 
dismi.ssal takes effect, the board must decide if the teaeber 1s capable of 
l8Swigart v. Ballou, supra. 
19Robinson v. School Directors of Dist. No.4, 96 Ill. App. 604 (1901). 
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remedying her violations. If they feel that the teacher's violations can be 
remedied, the board must first send her a warning notice. If she persists 
in breaking the rules of the board, the board has the legal right to dismiss 
her. The teacher has the right of appeal. 
The School Code enumerates the reasons which might warrant a teacher's 
dismissal in Section 10-22.4: 
To dismiss a teacher for incompetency, cruelty, 
negligence, immorality or other sufficient cause and to 
dismiss any teacher, whenever in its opinion, the interests 
of the schools require it, subject, however, to the provisions 
of Section 24-10 to 24-15, inclusive. Marriage is not a 
cause of removal. 
Illinois Courts have upheld this rule,20 but, the Court holds that the 
burden of the proof rests with the school board in dismissal of a teacher. 2l 
The common law privilege of the teacher to administer corporal punish-
ment, does not dispense her from obeying school board rules. Common law pro-
tecta the teacher from civil suit. 
The law does protect the teacher, however, if the school board should 
abuse its discretionary powers.22 
A case was adjudicated in the Illinois Appellate Court in August, 1964. 2 
Henry W. Miller, a physical education teacher in Calumet School, Dist. 132 of 
20SChool Directors v. Reddick, 77 Ill. 628 (1875); School Directors v. 
hirch 93 Ill. App. 499 (1901). 
2lSchool Directors v. Reddick, supra. 
22Supra. 
2~i1ler v. Board of Education, 37 Ill. App. 2d 451, 186 N.E.2d 790 (1964. 
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Cook County, was dismissed by the Calumet lioard of Education. The grounds for 
dismissal were established in four charges, the first being as follows: 
1. Inflicting corporal punishment on students, tl.ereby 
injuring them, and thereby violating the rulead the 
Board of Education prohibiting corporal punishment. 
The Circuit Court of Cook County reversed the Board's order of dismissal 
on the grounds that the Board had not complied with requirements in giving 
proper notice. No question was raised as to the Board·s decision on the merUs 
The Board appealed the judgment of the trial court. The Appellate Court 
reversed the SUlJlll&ry judgment entered in the trial court, restricting its 
balding to tbe Imint urged by the Board that the notice of dismissal was 
properly given relative to the 60-day period :prescribed by st;l,tute. The 
Appellate Court reviewed the case on the grounds that the charges made by the 
Board were never deter.:.l.:.ned as "remedial" or "irremediable" before the notice 
of charges was served. The Illinois Sehool Code outlines the legal procedur~ 
The Court said: 
•••• It may be said that by not giving a warning 
notice, the Board inferentially determined that the 
charges were irremediable •••• assuming such determination 
wal made, and its final decision on the hearing that the 
causes of dismissal are remediable, are subject to review. 25 
The Coure quoted the School Code in agreeing that the Board had the lega 
right to dismiss a teacher on the charges presented. The Court also stated 
that the Teacher Tenure Act of the School Code, Section 24-1 to 24-8, expressl 
24School Code, Sec. 24-12. 
251-1111er v. Board of Education, supra. 
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provide that the power of the Board to dismiss a teacher is in no way modified 
or diminished by the Teacher Tenure Act except with respect to the procedure 
of discharge. 
The purpose of the Teacher Tenure Act (enacted in 1941), was to protect 
Illinois teachers whose employment was otherwise at the mercy of school boards. 
The court clarified the Teacher Tenure Law in Donahoo v. Board of Educa-
Its object was to improve the Illinois school system 
by assuring teachers of experience and ability a continuous 
service and a rehiring based upon merit rather than failure 
to rehire based upon reasons that are political, partisan, 
or capricious. 26 
The Illinois School Code, therefore, pre-videa that a bo~_rd of education 
may dismiss a teacher who has entered upon contractual continued service (more 
than two consecutive sc!:.ool terms) t but only by following the procedure stated 
in the Teacher Tenure Act. The Court holds that where the language used in a 
statute is plain and certain. it must be given effect. 27 As a protection 
against the arbitrary use of the board's power of dismissal, the Tenure Act 
provides that i£ the charges for dismissal are lion account of causes that may 
be deemed to be remediable" by the board, before serving notice of such 
charges, specifically stating the causes which, if not removed, may result in 
bringing the charges of dismissal. 28 It is made clear that such a warning no-
tice must be given to the teacher with enough time to correct that which is 
causing the pending charges of dismissal. 
26Donahoo v. Board of Education, 413 Ill. 422, 109 N.E.2d 787. 
27Smith v. Board of Education, 405 Ill. 143. 89 N.E.2d 893. 
28Schoo1 Code, Sec. 24-3 (1959); Sec. 24-12 (1961 and 1963). 
In Keyes v. Board of Education, the court stated: 
•••• The underlyil1g reasuns for such provision, is the 
fact that the causes fordlsmissal re(arred to in sections 
6-36 and 7-16 of the School Code are general in their nature. 
If the causes upon which the Board predicates its dismissal 
can, by their nature, be said to be remediable, then ill 
order that the teacher may have an opportunity to remedy the 
sar..e., he or she is entitled to a specific warning notice of 
the specific charges constituting such causes. ObviouslZ, 
compliance with this warning notice erovision cannot be had 
unless, prior to giving a 'dismissal notice, determination 
is cade as to whether the cause or causes relied upon are 
remediab le. 
*: *: *: *: * 
TIle determination of the Board in the first instance 
that the causes of dismissal are not remediable and its final 
decision on the hearing, are both subject to review. If the 
causes relied on in the instant werl! in fact remed1...:.ble, thell 
the requirement that a written notice be given the plaintiff 
l-laS tlandatory and failure to comply therewith deprived the 
Board of jurisdiction. (Emphasis added). 29 
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The decision of the school board as to whether the charges for dismissal 
are remediable or irremediable is subject to review. 30 
The Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1945, 
ch. 110, 8 i 264-279) provides that upon review, the find-
ings and conclusions of the administrative agency shall be 
held prima facie true and correct and will not be set aside 
unless its decision is found to be without substantial 
foundation in th§ record or is against the manifest weight 
of the evidence. I 
29Kezes v. Board of Education, 20 Ill. App.2d 504~ 156 N.E.2d 763. 
30KeyeS v. Board of Education, supra.; Meridith v. Board of Education, 
7 IlL App.2d 477, 130 N.E.2d 5; Werner v. Community Unit School District No.4, 
40 Ill. App.2d 491, 190 N.E.2d 184; Hutchinson v. Board of Education, 32 Ill. 
App.2d 2'~7, 177 N.E.2d 436. 
31Miller v. Board of Education, supra. 
';5 
The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in the 
Hiller case on the grounds that findings of the Board tllat the charges were 
not remediable were against the manifest weight of the evideHce. Since the 
court held that the dismissal charges "rere remediable, a warning notice was 
required and the teacher had not received one. 
The plaintiff in the Hiller ca.se also stated that he had not been given 
a fair trial. TIle Board had acted as judge, prosecutor, can~lainantJ and 
witness; it was in no position to render an il;lpartia1 judgment. TIle agreement 
of the Court to this complaint was supported 11] Justice McCormick with a quote 
from Eidenmiller v. Board of Education, 28 Ill. App.2d 90, 170 N.E.2d 792. 
Justice McCormick quoted Justice Smith: 
The Teacher Tenure Law was designed to cure then 
existing evils in our school system providing a speedy, 
simple procecLre for the dismissal of teachers based on 
charges, notice, fair hearing and a speedy judicial review 
under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act. 
These benign purposes become obscure in this record. In 
Lusk v. Consolidated School District, 20 Ill. App.2d 252, 
we had occasion to say that the teacher is not only 
entitled to a hearing. she is entitled to a im hearing, 
that the administrative agency does not represent one 
party against the other. 1 Illinois Law' and Practice, 
page 461, and 'our study of the record raises a grave 
doubt that the hearing afforded in this case was the type 
of hearing which the legislature had in mind when i~ 
enacted the Teacher Tenure Law.' \fuat ,.,e then said of 
that record we now say of this. In so doing we fully 
recognize that the factual findings of an adminis~rative 
tribunal are by stqtute prima facie correct. that we are 
not concerned with the wisdom of the decision. and that 
the decision of an administrative agency will be set aside 
only where there is sup?ort in the record or is manifestly 
against the weight of the evidence. Keyes v. Board of 
Education, 20 Ill. App.2d 504; Pearson v. Community Unit 
School District No.5, 12 Ill. App.2d 44. We are thus 
circumscribed and inhibited by these rules when it may be 
said that a fair hearing was held. We do not understand 
that they inhibit us from determining whether the hearing 
as conducted, Has fa5.rly conducted 'i-:ithin the purpose, 
intent, and principles of the Teacher Tenure Law • 
•• •• In discussing eua! functions similar to those 
here, Judge William J. Brennan, Jr. (llOW Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court) had this to say: 
'The substantiality of evidence 
must take into cor-sideratlon whatever 
in the record fairly detracts from 
its Height. •• ' 
In re Larsen, N.J. Super. 564 • 
•••• In discussing tte case before us now, we deal 
not with a dual role, not \-71th a triple role, but ll1ith 
the quadruple roles of complainant, prosecutor, judge, 
and witness in a single tribunal. Our Supreme Court 
once said of a similar statute that, 'a statute which 
compels a litigant to submit his controversy to a 
tribunal of which his antagonist is a member, makes his 
antaEonist his judge, and does not I1fford clue process of 
law.' Commissioners of Drainage Dist. No.1 v. Smi~ 
223 Ill. 1;17. It is beyond the peri'lleter of our 
jurbdicUon to question the validity of the statute here 
involved or the authority of the Boord to proceed under 
it. It is within the perimeter of our jurisdiction, and 
it is our dut~ to determine whether this record hac! its 
birth in a fair hearing. before an impartial tribunal 
within the principles, purposes, and intent of the Teacher 
Tenure Lml. 
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'~r. Smith concludes his opinion by finding that the charges preferred against 
the teacher found no substantis.l support in eVidence, and he further says:1t 
•••• For ttts reason, and for the further reason that 
the hearing disclosed by this record, as conducted, was not 
in keeping with the ordinary concepts of American justice 
nor within the spirit. intent, principles or the letter of 
the Tenure Act, the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed •••• 
The weight of the evidence did not support the charges that Henry Miller 
had inflicted unreasonable corporal punishnent on any student. It was, however 
proven that he had violated the written rule of the Board prohibiting corporal 
punishment. Justice HcCormick had this interesting connnent to make: 
This court must take judicial notice of the present 
atmosphere existing in the schools of this County. The 
purpose of n school is to convey to the student" 
knowledge which will enable them to go further in 
the educational field and to help them to attni.n 
success in life. In order for a teac~er to function 
goperlX there flUS t be S0TllE! wax of implementing thE' 
requirement that the students behave in an orderly and 
respectfyl manner. That ir. maTly cl1ses students (10 not 
behave so 1s common knowledge. (Emphasis added). 
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The law in Illinois also protects the teacher from financial loss and 
expenses. The Illinois School Cods (1963) states: 
g 34-85. • ••• Pending the hearing of the charges, the 
person charged may be suspended in accordance with rules 
,Eresc:r.:ibed !?x. the board, hut such person, if acquitted, 
shall not suffer any loss of salary hy reason of the 
suspension. 
i 34-851>. • ••• If the decision of the board is 
reversed on review, the hoard 3h311 pay all the cou~t 
costg. 
I 34-853. • ••• One-half of the cost of the reporter's 
attendance sll '.11 be paid by the board and one-half by the 
teacher. Either party desiring a transcript shall pay the 
cos t thereof. 
It is now mandatory that school boards insure all employees against civi 
suit actions. The law is stated in the School Code, Section 34-18.1. 
The teacher's authority to administer corporal punishment may be Umited 
by the prescribed rules of the school board. 'But, the Common law holds that 
the scope of the teacher's duty is not limited to punish1n~ acts of misconduct 
'ihich occur in the course of the school day, if such acts t,,,:ve a direct and 
immediate effect on the school. In O'Rourke v. Walker, the court said: 
•••• A teach~r has the right to punish a pupil for 
an offense committed after the pupil's return home, where 
such an offense has an effect upon the morale and efficiency 
of the school. 32 
---------.. -----------------
320'Rourke v. Walker, 102 Conn. 130, 128 A. 25, 41 A.L.R. 1380 (1925). 
CHAPTER V 
LEGAL POSITION OF THE PUPIL 
Blackstone states that the legal duties of parents toto1ard their children 
are three: (1) maintenance, (2) protection, (3) education. 1 Gavit elaborates 
on each of Blackstone's duties of parents. Parents have th.e obligation of 
maintenance toward their children as a principle of the natural law. By 
begetting children, parents entered into a voluntary ohligation to do all in 
their power to preserve the life of lives they had bestowed. 2 
Protection is also a natural duty, which is rather peng:! tted than 
enjoined by any municipal la,~; nature in this respect needing a cheek rather 
than a spur. A parent l:'ay maintain a child in a law suit, and may justify an 
assault and battery, in defense of his child. 3 
Education is the duty pointed out to the parent by reason and is of 
4 greatest importance. 
The state binds the parent in the obligation of educating the child. 
Every state has laws in its statutes compelling parents to educate their chUd 






reno These are known as compulsory education laws. These laws have been 
attacked as being unconstitutional, but the courts have always upheld them. 
The Constitutional objection raised is that by compelling school attendance, 
the individual liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution is unreasonably 1nfringed.5 In answer to this objection 
the Court has stated: 
Since the welfare of the State is served by the 
creation of an enlightened citizenry, the enactment of 
the compulsory attendance laws is held to be a valid 
exercise of the police power of the state.6 
A parent is free to choose a private or public school, in the fulfillmen 
of this obligation, so long as the school follows the required program of 
education established by the state. 7 
The Illinois School Code, Section 26-2 contains the compulsory education 
law of the State of Illinois. It reads: 
Enrolled pupils below 7 or over 16. Any person having 
custody or control of a child who is below the age of 7 years 
or above the age of 16 years and who is enrolled in any of 
grades 1 through 12, in the public school shall cause him 
to attend the public school in the district wherein he 
resides when it is in session during the regular school term 
unless he is excused under paragraphs 2, 3, or 4 of Section 
26-1. 
5Robert R. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and Public Education, 
(Brooklyn: Foundation Press, Inc., 1959), p.506. 
6 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 
39 A.L.R. 468 (1925). 
7School Code (1963), 126-2, p.239. 
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Enforcement of compulsory attendance rules must be tempered with common 
sense. If a child is ill, or other good cause exists for failure to attend 
school, he is not truant and his parents are not guilty of keeping him out of 
school contrary to law. 8 Section 26-1 lists the reasons which legally exempt 
certain children from attending public schools. 
Parents have a natural right of authority over their children. However, 
by common law in the State of Illinois, they must delegate at least a portion 
9 
of their parental authority to the teaeher. 
Section 153 of the Restatement to the Law of Torts lO defines the powers 
of the parents to restrict the authority of one standing in loeo parentis in 
the matter of discipline. Section 153 (1) states that a parent who sends his 
child to a private school may delegate only as much power to discipline the 
child as he, the parent, chooses to give • 
•••• Thus, if a private school chooses to accept a 
child whose parents have stipulated that the punishments 
usual in the school shall not be inflicted upon him, the 
school ~ter is not privileged to inflict the usual 
punishments even though they are otherwise permissible. 
If the punishment inflicted by such a school master is 
not excessive and 1s inflicted upon a proper occasion, 
the fact that the school or institution forbids it does 
not destroy the schoolmaster's privilege. This is so 
unless the parent's knowledge of the rules is shown to 
have operated as an inducement to send the child to a 
particular school. in which case the parent may be assumed 
to have delegated only so much of his privilege as is 
consistent with the school rules. 
Saamilton and Hort. p.507. 
9pox v. The Peoele. supra.; Drake v. Thomas, supra. 
lOaestatement to the Law of Torts, See. 153, p.352. 
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TIle parent is not free to restrict the person in loco parentis in a pub-
lie school. Section 153 (2) states: 
One who is in charge of the training or education of 
a group of children is privileged to apply such force or 
impose such confinement upon one or more of them as is 
reasonably necessary to secure observance of the discipline 
necessary for the education and training of the children 
as a group. 11 
It is legally presumed that the school authorities have acted properly 
in administering any type of punishment, providing the teacher has not acted 
from malice and the injury was not of a permanent nature. It is further pre-
sumed that the authorities acted in good faith. 12 In Illinois, there is a 
presumption in favor of the teacher's action in an action against a teacher 
for assault and battery for inflicting corporal punishment on a pupil. However, 
in the State of Illinois, the burden of proof that the teacher acted correctly 
13 14 
rests upon the teacher, not upon the child. 
The parent is the legal protector of the child. If the teacher violates 
the right of the child, the parent may bring civil action for damages against 
the teacher. The State of Illinois holds that the elements and measure of 
damage in a civil action follow this principle: 
A successful plaintiff in an action for assault and 
battery is entitled to damages for his actual injuries 
and losses, and he may be awarded exemplary damages where 
the defendant's conduct was malicious, wanton, or in 
reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights. 15 
l2Fox v. The People, supra.; Drake v. Thomas, supra. 
13Swigart v. Ballou, supra. 
l4Supra• 
151111n01s Law and Practice Vol. 3 ch. 2 827. 
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The person seeking action in a civil suit for assaul t and battery is 
16 
entitled to such damages and will compensate him for injuries sustained. He 
is also entitled to compensation for the consequences and sufferings arising 
17 from assault and battery, proximate to the occasion, hut is not limited to 
the day of the assault. 18 
III judgin& uhether a punishment was excessive or not t the Illinois Court 
will take the pupil's past conduct into consideration and will not judge solely 
19 from the instant in question. 
The Illinois Courts hold also, that letters written by a parent to schoo 
authorities containing requests or instructions to discipline that parent's 
child, are held as express delegations of parental authority. All other thin~ 
being equal, the parent cannot then hold a teacher liable in civil action.
20 
The purpose of the state in permitting the teacher to administer reason-
able corporal punishment is the welfare of the child. As Justice McCormick 
baa said, fI ••• there must be some way of implementing the requirement that the 
students behave in an orderly and respectful manner. ull When the punishment, 
however, is excessive, it loses the purpose for which it is permitted. 22 
16Jones v. Jones, 71 Ill. 562 (1814). 
17 SInter v. Rinll:, 18 n 1. 527 (1857). 
18I111nois Law and Practice, ~. cit. 
19nrake v. Thomas» supra. 
20supra. 
21Mi1ler v. Board of F~ucationt supra. 
22State v. Pendergrass, N.C. (2 Devereux and Battle's Law) 365, 31 Am. 
Dec. 416. 
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The common law also holds t:lat if a teacher inflicts a punishment upon 
a child which is in excess of that which is privileged. the child has the 
23 privilege to defend himself against the attempted excessive force. 
The Texas Court of Crihtinal Appeals had before it in 1920, a case in 
which a pupil was convicted of manslaughter. The teacher had taken the child 
beyond the school grounds to a wooded area with the intention of chastising 
him. The court agreed that it was lawful for the teacher to chastise the 
child beyond the school grounds, but the court also stated: 
The state authorizes the schoolteacher to punish 
moderately his pupils. If it passes beyond that and 
the punishment is immoderate, or for the purpose of 
revenge or is maliciously done, then the right does 
not exist, and the right of self-defense obtains. 
From all eVidence, the pupil had not intended to kill his teacher. The 
weapon which he used to protect himself against attack was an ordinary pocket 
knife. The court considered the attack as not within the right of the teacher. 
Perhaps the teacher and the parent do stand on the same level insofar as 
the determination of the need for punishment is concerned but not as to the 
limits to which it shall be carried. 25 
When a teacher gave a child a choice of corporal punishment in order to 
save himself from expUlsion from school. the court held such action as a def 
to charge the teacher with assault and battery. In VanVactor v. State, the 
court said: 
23 Restatement to the Law of Torts, 1155, p.354. 
24D111 v~ State, 87 Tex. Cr. 49, 219 S.W. 481 (1920). 
25Robert W. Miller, "Resort to Corporal Punishment 1n Enforcing School 
Discipline," 1 Syracuse Law Rev.!!:!. (1950), p.254. 
The teacher has no right to chastise for all offenses 
as has the parent. The teacher's right in that respect is 
restricted to the lit:1its of his jurisdiction and responsibility 
as a teacher. 26 
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A teacher was held liable because she had whipped a child for not study-
ing geography, a subject which she knew the child's parents had forbidden him 
to study. The court held that it is within the right of the parent to choose 
the child's course of study; the parent cannot be denied all ri~lt to control 
27 
the education of his children. 
On the other hand, a teacher cannot be held liable for administering 
reasonable corporal punishment to a pupil whose parents had forbidden him to 
take a particular subject, but never informed the teacher. A teacher physically 
ejected from the classroom a pupil, who, after several days warning, refused to 
speak in the public speaking class. He informed the teacher that his parents 
had forbidden him to take the course after the teacher ejected him from the 
room. The court held that the parents could not expect the teacher to receive 
their child under his instruction without conforming to reasonable rules. 
Compelling a child to speak in a public speaking course seemed reasonable to 
the court. 28 
Parents likeliise have the duty to inform the teacher of any physical or 
constitutional weaklless of the child which might result in serious injury in 
what would otherwise be reasonable corporal punishment. If the teacher admin-
26VanVactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276, 15 N.E. 341 (1887). 
27Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59. 
28Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N.H. 473. 
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istars corporal punislu>lOnt within tho scope of her leba1 authority, and through 
au unknown weakness of the child by the teacher. hanlf1.11 effects result, the 
parents cannot recover for daxilages. 29 
Nevertheless, the teacher is responsible to consider the physical stret1§ 
before imposing any punishment on a child. The Court in Virginia held a 24-
year-old male tuacher guilty of second degree murder when a 7-year-old female 
30 
pupil died from a whipping with a switch 3 feet long. 
A parent cannot limit the scope of the teacher's authority to the hours 
within wh'ch school is in session. It is well-established that the power of 
the school authorities does not cease absolutely "'hen the students leave the 
school premises. Conduct a-way from the school grounds may subject a pupil to 
school discipline if it directly affects the good order and welfare of the 
school. On the other hand, the school board cannot Flake rules and regulations 
governing student conduct ..mere the looral9, order, and discipline are not 
directlyaffected. 3l 
The, principle that a teacher's authority cannot be limited to school 
hours or school premises was enunciated in an old Vermont case, Lander v. 
Seaver. An ll-year-old boy, ninety minutes after the dismissal of school, 
spoke disrespectfully to the teache.r in the presence of a fellow pupU. Upon 
his return to school the following morning, the teacher pmliahed the boy with 
a small rawhide whip for his show of disrespect. The court said: 
29Quinn v. Nolan, supra. 
30Johnson v. Commonwealth, 111 Va. 877, 69 S.E. 1104 (1911). 
31Uobbs v. Cermany, 94 Miss. 469, 29 L.R.A. 983 (1909). 
It is conc(~ded his right to punish extends to nchool 
hours, and there seems to be no reasonable doubt that the 
supervision and control of the n4'lstcr over the scholar 
extends from the time he leaves home to go to school till 
he returns LOrie from school •••• \Jheu the child has returned 
home to his parent's control, then the parental authority 
is resumed anti the control of the teacher ceascr;, ano then, 
for all ordinar~y acts of mishehavior the parent alone has the 
p(Jt/Jer to pUllish •••• 
•••• But where the offense (committed after school hours) 
has a direct and i1l1l1.1ed:iate tendency to injure the school and 
bring the master's authority into contempt, as in this case, 
w'hen done in the presence of other scholars and of the master J 
and with the design to insult him, we think he has the right 
to punisl-1 the scholars if he cones again to schooL ••• But 
the tendency of tbe acts so done out of the teacher's 
supervision for ~~Thich he may punish, must be direct and 
innnediate on their bearing upon the welfare of the school, 
or the authority of the master and the respect due him •••• 
Hence each case must be determined by its peculiar circum-
stances •••• 32 
The courts have upheld teachers for <Hbinistering corporal punishment 
for the folloving offenses committed outside of school hours and away from 
school grounds: abusing 010 small girls;33 using profane language and fightin 
showing disrespect to school authorities. 35 
School boards are limited in their powers to make rules and regulations 
which affect pupil conduct once they reach home. The courts have upheld the 
right of the parent over their children's conduct, and will not permit the 
board to en.rorce rules \,Jhich do not have a direct tendency on the school. 
32Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 .\ro. Dee. 156 (1859). 
330 , Rourk~_.!!. t"alker, supra. 
34Deskins v. Gose. 85 ?10. 485, 55 Am. Rep. 387 (1885). 
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In Hobbs v. Germany, a. boy attended service at churc~l i;J. the evening with 
his father. Tlese hour:3 haJ been Jesignated by the school board as study hours 
It ,~as considered that the boy had violated the rule. The boy was compelled 
to submit to corporal punishment or confinement in a schoolroom for forty 
minutes during the noon hour for five days. The boy refused to do either and 
was expelled. The c;)urt said: 
•••• It may be that the school authorities would 
have a right to make certain regulations and rules for 
the good government of the school which would extend and 
control the child even when it has reached home; but, if 
that power exists, it can ollly be done ill matters which 
would per ~ have a direct and pernicious effect on the 
moral tone of the school. or have a tendency to subvert 
and uestroy the proper administration of school affairs. 36 
36Uobbs v. Germany, supra. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY 
The proposal for this study was to survey the principles enunciated by 
Illinois COU4tS in litigated decisions in regard to the rights, responsibili-
ties, and liabilities of teachers 'and other school authorities to discipline 
pupils with corporal punishment. The findings of this study are related 
particulaLly to the State of Illinois, and are as follmvs: 
1. Since the School Code of Illinois is silent on the matter of disci-
pline, the formulation of a discipline policy is the delegated responsibility 
of the individual school board. 
2. The rules and regulations, and by-laws of school boards have the 
force of municipal ordinances. 
3. The teacher has the right to punish to enforce order, decency, deco-
rum. and good government in the school. 
4. Three types of legal actions can grow out of corporal punishment 
cases: criminal action for assault and battery; civil action for assault and 
battery; proceedings initiated by the school board to dismiss a teacher. 




6. In punishing a pupil, a teacher may take into consideration the pu-
pil's habitual conduct. In Illinois, serious habitual acts of misconduct are 
admissible as evidence in court to justify the teacher's actions. 
7. The relationship of the teacher to pupil as one standing in the p1a~ 
of the parent (in loco parentis) justifies the use of reasonable force without 
the incurrence of liability. 
8. The teacher, in loco parentis, occupies a quasi-judicial capacity. 
In Illinois, a teacher will be granted the benefit of the doubt for an error 
in judgment if the punishment inflicted is excessive, but there must be a 
clear absence of malice in motive and intent, and no permanent damage results 
from the punishment. 
9. The criteria by which a teacher will be judged for her actions in 
the use of corporal punishment are: a. teacher's motive; b. nature of pupil's 
misconduct; c. means used to administer punishment; d. extent of resulting 
injury to pupil; e. pupil's sex, strength, age, mental maturity. 
10. The teacher is "privileged" in the use of reasonable force. 
11. Malice will not be implied as a result of excessive punishment by 
teacher unless permanent damage results. 
12. Factors by which the court will judge the "reasonableness" of 
punishment are: a. nature of offense; b. apparent motive of offender; 
c. influence of his example to other children; d. sex; e. age; and, f. 
physical and mental condition of the child. 
13. In Illinois, the jury will decide if the punishment is reasonable 
in the minds of reasonable men. 
14. Negligence cannot figure in an action for assault and battery. 
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15. Illinois courts hold that a teacher, as one in loco parentis, is 
delegated at least a portion of parental authority. 
16. ttTeaeher, H in the State of Illinois, means any or all district 
employees required to be certified under the laws relating to certification 
of teachers. 
17. The Superintendent is not a teacher, and therefore, has no right to 
discipline the students. Under certain circumstances. a member of the school 
board may discipline students. 
18. Letters of requests for action to be taken to improve a child's 
conduct, will be considered express delegation of parental authority, when the 
same are addressed to the principal and teacher by the parent. 
19. Peculiar to the State of Illinois, the teacher bears the responsi-
bility for the burden of proof that her action was justified. 
20. School boards have the legal right to dismiss a teacher for cruelty 
negligence. incompetence. immorality, or whenever th6 iM~3rest8 of the school 
requires it. Such actions must be 1n accord with the legal procedure outlined 
in the School Code. or the board is liable. 
21. The teacher 1s protected against the abuse of discretionary powers 
by the school board by: 
a. The Teacher Tenure Law. 
b. The Administrative Review Law. 
22. Parents can limit the authority of teachers in private schools in 
the matter of punishment; they cannot limit the authority of public school 
teachers as this is the duty of the state. 
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23. The child has the right of self-defense in the face of an attempt 
of excessive punishment. He is privileged to defend himself. 
24. The child cannot be punished for obeying his parents in not taking 
a particular course of study. The right of the parent to choose the course 
prevails. 
25. The teacher must be informed that the child is forbidden to take 
the course. He is not liable if he is unaware of this fact and punishes the 
child. 
26. The teacher. not liable for results of a harmful nature from 
reasonable punishment if the parent never informed her of a child's physical 
weakness. 
27. If death results from excessive punishment of a child the teacher 
may be convicted of murder. 
28. The authority of the teacher is not limited to punishing acts of 
misconduct to school hours. She may punish pupils for acts commdtted outside 
of school hours and away from school grounds if such acts have a direct harm-
ful tendency on the school, or if such acts are subversive to the authority of 
the teacher. 
29. The teacher should not administer corporal punishment, even if it 
is reasonable, if the school board forbids such action. 
30. The sch~ol board may not make any rules governing the conduct of 
pupils outside school hours and away from school grounds, unless such rules 
have a direct tendency on the school. 
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31. It 1s the right of the parent to oversee the conduct of children 
once they return home from school, unless such conduct directly undermines the 
authority and good order of the school. 
Conclusions: 
There have been three cases involving corporal punishment by teachers 
litigated in the Illinois Appellate Court: 
Fox v. The People, 84 Ill. App. 270 (1898); 
Swigart v. Ballou, 106 Ill. App. 266 (1903); 
Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941). 
In all three cases the children were boys. In the two earlier cases, 
Fox and Swigart, the boys were about 9 years old. The Drake boy was 15 years 
old and considered incorrigible by school authorities. 
Palmer Seaney, the pupil in the Fox Case, was punished for misbehavior 
during the noon hour of the previous day; he was whipped. The Drake pupil was 
punished for acts of misbehavior causing disturbance in the classroom of a 
school for incorrigibles. His punishment consisted of blows on the thighs with 
a paper tube. The teachers in both of these cases were males. 
The pupil in the Swigart case W~~ punished for a series of acts of mis-
behavior; he was whipped. The teacher was a female. 
The trial courts found all the teachers guilty. The Appellate Court 
reversed the decisions involving the male teachers on the grounds that the 
punishment was reasonable and necessary evidence had erroneously been excluded 
by the court in one case. 
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In the case of the female teacher, the Appellate Court reversed the 
decision of the lower court on the technicality that the burden of the proof 
shouldbave been borne by the teacher, not the boy. Therefore, the teacher was 
found guilty, ~ not for unlawful corporal punishment. 
Therefore, in all three cases the Illinois Appellate Court upheld reason 
able corporal punishment. 
Recommendations~ 
It is not a purpose within the scope of this study to discuss the merits 
or demerits of the use of corporal punishment in the discipline of students. 
Certainly, the use of such discipline incurs the danger of legal liability and 
its psychological value is subject to question. 
Where the school board has a written rule prohibiting the use of corpora 
punishment, a teacher must abide by it. 
However, if the board has no policy regulating the use of corporal pun-
ishment and the teacher feels that there is some merit in its employment, she 
may use it. She should be cautious. Gail Inlow gives the following procedures 
which a teacher should employ when she deems it necessary to inflict corporal 
1 punishment. 
1. Consult the principal to assure his support. 
2. Ask the principal to notify the parents regarding the contemplated 
action. 
3. Whenever possible, have a central authority figure administer the 
punishment. (Note: Be sure he falls into the category described under 
"teacher" in the Illinois School Code.) 
ICail M. Inlow, Maturity in High School Teaching, (~nglewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963) ~. 373. 
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4. Rave a witness present. 
5. Ascertain that the one who administers the punishment is of the same 
sex as the offender. 
6. Keep the case in strict privacy from beginning to end. 
Inlow then adds, nAnd after these criteria have been adhered to, it is 
quite possible that such premeditation will result ultimately in the selection 
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